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The prevalence of envelope wages in former Soviet Baltic states 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose 
This paper evaluates the prevalence of an illegitimate wage arrangement in the former 
Soviet Baltic states whereby formal employers pay their formal employees both an 
official declared wage as well as a supplementary undeclared (‘envelope’) wage. 
 
Methodology 
A 2007 Eurobarometer survey is reported that evaluates envelope wage practices in 27 
EU member states. This paper focuses upon the 4,031 face-to-face interviews conducted 
in the four former Soviet Baltic republics that are now member states of the EU, namely 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. 
 
Findings 
Some 1 in 8 formal employees in these former Soviet Baltic republics received an 
undeclared ‘envelope’ wage from their formal employer during the past 12 months which 
on average amounted to 45% of their gross wage packet. Although this practice is 
concentrated in smaller businesses, the construction industry, and amongst younger 
people, manual workers and lower income groups in these former Sovet Baltic states, it is 
by no means confined to specific pockets of the economic landscape. Rather, it exists 
throughout these countries in all business types and employee groups. 
 
Research implications 
The existence and commonality of envelope wages reveals the need to transcend the 
dichotomous depiction of formal and informal jobs as always separate and discrete and to 
recognise how they can be inextricably interwoven. 
 
Practical implications 
This paper outlines a range of potential policy measures for tackling envelope wages and 
calls for their piloting and evaluation. 
 
Originality 
The first cross-national evaluation of the incidence and nature of envelope wages in the 
former Soviet Baltic states and what needs to be done to tackle this practice. 
 
 
Research Paper 
 
Keywords: tax non-compliance; informal economy; undeclared work; envelope 
wages; Baltic region; European Union. 
 
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
Since the turn of the new millennium, a small tributary of scholarly thought in the former 
Soviet Baltic republics has started to highlight a little discussed illegitimate wage 
arrangement that is being used by formal employers. This is the work practice whereby 
employers pay their formal employees two wages, an official wage which is declared to 
the state for tax and social security purposes and an unofficial ‘envelope’ wage which is 
not declared and allows employers to avoid paying their full social insurance and tax 
liabilities (Hazans, 2005; Karpuskiene, 2007; OECD, 2003; Sedlenieks, 2003; Woolfson, 
2007; Žabko and Rajevska, 2007). Until now, only small-scale qualitative studies of this 
practice have been conducted. The result is that it remains unknown whether this 
violation of work payment principles by formal employers exists throughout the Baltic 
region and beyond, or merely in a few small enclaves. The intention in this paper is to 
seek to begin to fill that gap.  
To do this, the paper commences by showing how although an understanding of 
this illegitimate wage practice is emerging through small-scale qualitative studies, there is 
currently a distinct lack of knowledge on its overall prevalence, nature and distribution in 
the Baltic region and beyond. To resolve this, the second section introduces a cross-
national survey conducted in 2007 across the 27 European Union (EU) member states 
involving 26,659 face-to-face interviews. In this paper, the focus will be upon the data 
collected from the 4,031 face-to-face interviews conducted in the former Soviet Baltic 
republics of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Analysing the findings, the third 
section will reveal that a significant minority of formal employees in these Baltic states 
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receive an additional undeclared envelope wage from their formal employer and that even 
if this practice is more common in some countries, types of business and population 
groups than others, it exists throughout the economic landscape of the Baltic region. The 
final section then briefly addresses why it prevails, its impacts and the various policy 
options for tackling this wage practice in the Baltic region and beyond. 
 
Previous research on envelope wages   
 
A large body of literature now exists on the extent and nature of undeclared work in 
Baltic nations (e.g., Henckel et al, 2008; Pavlovskaya, 2004; Persson and Malmer, 2006; 
Surdej, 2005; Williams, and Round, 2007) and other regions beyond (e.g., Bajada and 
Schneider 2005; Round and Williams, 2008; Schneider 2008; Wallace and Latcheva 
2006; Williams and Windebank, 1998). Few studies, however, have analysed the issue of 
envelope wages. This is because the recurring assumption in this vast literature on 
undeclared work is that jobs are either formal or informal, but never simultaneously both. 
In other words, formal jobs are depicted as separate and discrete from informal jobs. 
They are viewed as dualistic opposites. The consequence is that few have enquired 
whether formal employers employing formal employees might be simultaneously 
engaging in informal practices with them. In recent years, however, undeclared work has 
started to be re-theorised in that the dichotomous depiction of formal and informal 
employment as binary opposites has started to be transcended. 
A small emergent stream of literature, that is, has started to draw attention to an 
illegitimate wage practice that brings into question this depiction of formal and informal 
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jobs as separate and discrete. This is the employment arrangement where formal 
employees receive from their formal employer two wages, an official wage declared to 
the state for tax and social security purposes and an unofficial ‘envelope’ wage which is 
not declared (Hazans, 2005; Karpuskiene 2007; Neef 2002; Sedlenieks 2003; Williams 
2007; Williams and Round 2007; Woolfson, 2007; Žabko and Rajevska 2007). Such an 
arrangement is primarily used by employers to avoid paying their full social insurance 
and tax liabilities but is also used to avoid redundancy pay in that its withdrawal acts as a 
useful tool to encourage employees no longer wanted to voluntarily leave (Hazans 2005; 
Round et al. 2008).  
Previous studies of envelope wages have tended to be small-scale qualitative 
studies which have provided in-depth portrayals of this wage practice primarily in Baltic 
countries such as Latvia (OECD, 2003; Sedlenieks, 2003; Žabko and Rajevska, 2007), 
Lithuania (Karpuskiene, 2007; Woolfson 2007) and Russia (Williams and Round, 2007) 
but also in several other East-Central European nations such as Romania (Neef, 2002) 
and Ukraine (Round et al., 2008; Williams, 2007). For instance, the study in Lithuania by 
Woolfson (2007) is an in-depth case study of one person, albeit a cause celebre, whilst 
the Latvian study by Sedlenieks (2003) reports 15 face-to-face interviews conducted in 
Riga. Although the Ukraine survey covers 600 households, it is limited to three localities 
(Williams, 2007), whilst the evidence from Russia is based on interviews with 313 
households in three districts of Moscow (Williams and Round 2007). None are national-
level representative sample surveys.  
Despite this, such studies provide a strong rationale for the further study of this 
practice. Some 30 per cent of employees in Ukraine reported receiving envelope wages 
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(Williams, 2007) and two-thirds (65 per cent) in Moscow (Williams and Round, 2007). 
Comparing labour force and employer surveys, meanwhile, the OECD (2003) find that 20 
per cent of private sector employees in Latvia earn envelope wages. What remains 
unknown, however, is whether this is ubiquitous or confined to a few small pockets of the 
Baltic region. Consequently, in 2007, a survey was undertaken to more fully understand 
its extent, nature and distribution in Baltic countries. 
 
Examining envelope wages in the former Soviet Baltic states 
 
Is it common for employees in the four former Soviet Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Poland to be paid an envelope wage by their formal employers? If so, 
where is it common and amongst whom? And are such wages paid for overtime or for 
regular hours worked? To answer these questions, a 2007 survey is here reported whose 
origins lie in late 2005 when the European Commission funded a team (which included 
this paper’s author) to design a questionnaire to investigate undeclared work in the EU 
(TNS Infratest et al., 2006). This was subsequently implemented as Special 
Eurobarometer No. 284 (‘Undeclared work in the European Union’), as part of wave 67.3 
of Eurobarometer.  
The current paper reports the findings of this survey with regard to envelope 
wages, the subject matter of one section of the questionnaire, in the four former Soviet 
Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Replicating the sampling 
method of other Eurobarometer surveys, 4,031 face-to-face interviews were conducted in 
these four countries. In each nation, national marketing agencies used the same multi-
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stage random (probability) sampling method to select 1,000 respondents. The outcome is 
one of the first insights into the prevalence, distribution and nature of envelope wages in 
these former Soviet Baltic republics in particular and the EU more generally.  
For each country, a number of sampling points were drawn with probability 
proportional to population size (for total coverage of the country) and to population 
density according to the Eurostats NUTS II (or equivalent) and the distribution of the 
resident population in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. In each of these 
selected sampling units, a starting address was then randomly drawn. Further addresses 
(every nth address) were selected using standard ‘random route’ procedures from the 
initial address. This is the standard sampling methodology employed in all 
Eurobarometer surveys in EU member states. 
Within each household, meanwhile, the respondent was drawn at random 
(following the ‘closest birthday rule’). All interviews were conducted face-to-face in 
people’s homes and in the appropriate national language with adults aged 15 years and 
over. So far as the data collation is concerned, CAPI (Computer assisted personal 
interview) was used in countries where it was available. For all countries, a national 
weighting procedure was then employed for analysis purposes that used marginal and 
intercellular weighting by comparing the sample with the universe description taken from 
Eurostat population data and national statistical offices. This weighting procedure ensures 
that in each country, the gender, age, region and size of locality of the sample is 
proportionate to the universe. The data was collated and analysed using the Statistical 
Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) while the statistical significance of the findings in 
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relation to the likelihood of participation across groups, was measured at the 0.05(*), 0.01 
(**) and 0.001 (***) levels.  
To gather data, the face-to-face interview schedule covered a wide array of 
questions on both undeclared work and under-declared (i.e., envelope) employment. 
Given the focus of this paper solely on envelope wages, discussion here is confined to 
questions on this issue. Firstly, respondents were asked, ‘Sometimes employers prefer to 
pay all or part of the regular salary or the remuneration for extra work or overtime hours 
cash-in-hand and without declaring it to tax or social security authorities. Did your 
employer pay you all or part of your income in the last 12 months in this way?’. 
Secondly, and to decipher whether this was for regular work, overtime payments or both, 
interviewees were asked ‘Was this income part of the remuneration for your regular 
work, was it payments for overtime, or both?’ and thirdly, they were asked for the 
percentage of their gross yearly income from their main formal job received on an 
undeclared basis. To evaluate their attitudes towards this practice, finally, they were 
asked whether they were happy receiving a part of their salary without having it declared 
or whether they would have preferred to have their total salary declared. Below, the 
results are reported.  
 
The prevalence and distribution of envelope wages in the former Soviet 
Baltic republics 
 
Of the 4,031 face-to-face interviews conducted in the four former Soviet Baltic republics 
of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, some 1,751 were with formal employees. Of 
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these, some 1 in 8 (11.9 per cent) reported receiving envelope wages in the past 12 
months amounting on average to 45 per cent of their total wage packet. Of these 158 
employees reporting that they receive envelope wages, 42 per cent received such 
payments for regular hours worked, 16 per cent for overtime or extra work and the 
remainder (39 per cent) for both regular work and overtime combined.  
This varies markedly to the EU as a whole. Of 26,659 face-to-face interviews 
conducted in the 27 EU member states, 11,887 were conducted with formal employees, 
of whom 1 in 20 (5 per cent) were paid envelope wages (compared with 12 per cent in 
these Baltic countries), amounting on average to 41 per cent of their gross monthly wage 
packet (45 per cent in these Baltic states). Of the 616 formal employees paid an envelope 
wage by their formal employer in the EU, 29 per cent received this for their regular work 
hours (42 per cent in Baltic countries), 27 per cent for extra work or overtime (16 per cent 
in Baltic countries) and 36 per cent for both their regular and overtime work (39 per cent 
in Baltic nations). A greater proportion of envelope wages are paid for reguar hours 
worked in these former Soviet Baltic replublics, in consequence, than in the EU as a 
whole where envelope wages are more commonly used to reimburse overtime or extra 
work.   
A significant minority of the formal labour force in these Baltic states, in 
consequence, report receiving envelope wages and given the sensitivity of this issue, this 
is probably a lower-bound estimate of the extent of this wage arrangement. To evaluate 
whether this wage practice is confined to a few small pockets of the Baltic labour market 
or is more ubiquitous, attention now turns to evaluating the distribution of this practice 
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firstly, cross-nationally, secondly, across different types of business and thirdly, across 
population groups.  
 
Cross-national variations within the Baltic region 
 
As Table 1 reveals, there are clear cross-national variations in the prevalence of envelope 
wage practices across these four former Soviet  Baltic states. Envelope wages is most 
common in Latvia where nearly one-fifth of formal employees receive an additional 
envelope wage and nearly half receive these additional undeclared wages as 
reimbursement for their regular hours worked. In Estonia, in contrast, just 8 per cent 
receive envelope wages which amount on average to 31 per cent of their wage packet and 
a greater proportion is paid for overtime or extra work, or for a combination of both 
reguar hours worked and overtime. Lithuania is and Poland sit in the middle of these two 
countries. It is important to recognise, moreover, that in these post-Soviet Baltic 
countries, envelope wages are more common than in the EU as a whole, and such wages 
are more commonly paid more for regular hours worked and constitute a higher 
proportion of formal employees’ wages. In the EU more widely, envelope wages are less 
common, paid largely for overtime or extra work and they usually amount only to a 
smaller proportion of employees’ wage packets.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Despite this uneven distribution of the practice of paying envelope wages both across 
these Baltic countries and between these Baltic states and the EU more generally, it is 
nevertheless important to recognise that this is a common practice that prevails 
everywhere to differing degrees.   
 
Which businesses pay envelope wages in Baltic countries? 
 
Table 2 details which Baltic businesses pay envelope wages. It shows that although the 
practice prevails across all businesses, it is smaller- rather than larger-sized businesses 
that are significantly more likely to pay envelope wages. Some one in five (19 per cent) 
employees in businesses with 1-20 employees receive envelope wages from their formal 
employer, but just 2 per cent of employees in businesses with over 500 employees. The 
outcome is that two-thirds (65 per cent) of those receiving envelope wages are in small 
businesses with 1-20 employees despite only one-third (33 per cent) of all employees 
being in such businesses. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
It is also the case that some sectors are more likely to pay envelope wages than others. 
High proportions of formal employees receive envelope wages in hotels, restaurants and 
cafes (16 per cent of all formal employees), construction (20 per cent) and the retail 
industry (16 per cent). Indeed, 30 per cent of those receiving envelope wages are in the 
construction industry, 18 per cent in personal services, 19 per cent in the retail sector and 
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14 per cent in manufacturing industry. It is important to recognise, nevertheless, that this 
wage practice is not confined to a few small pockets of the Baltic economic landscape but 
is omnipresent.  
 
Who receives envelope wages in Baltic countries? 
 
Table 3 evaluates whether some employees are more likely to be paid envelope wages 
than others. It reveals that although all employee groups engage in this wage practice, 
men, younger people, those leaving education between 16 and 19 years old, manual 
workers, low-income earners and those working long hours are significantly more likely 
to be paid envelope wages. Indeed, over two-thirds (70 per cent) of those receiving 
envelope wages are men, three-quarters (77 per cent) are aged 15-39, 71 per cent left 
school between 16 and 19 years old, 66 per cent earn less than €500 per month  and the 
vast majority (87 per cent) work over 31 hours per week.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
However, although this wage practice is skewed heavily towards certain groups, it is not 
confined to specific echelons of the labour force in these Baltic countries (e.g., low-paid 
male manual workers). Indeed, those with relatively low formal incomes receive smaller 
proportions of their total salary as an envelope wage, while those with higher formal 
salaries receive greater proportions of their total salary on an undeclared basis. The 
outcome is that when envelope wages are included in the overall wage equation, wage 
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inequalities in these former Soviet Baltic states will be wider than when only formal 
incomes are analysed. It is not the case, therefore, that envelope wages mean that the 
lower-paid receive relatively higher salaries and as such, that little concern needs to be 
shown about their wage levels. Instead, quite the opposite is the case. In these Baltic 
countries, when envelope wages are taken into account, relative wage disparities grow 
wider than when they are omitted.  
 
Envelope wages: reasons, impacts and potential policy responses 
Explaining the existence of envelope wages   
In Baltic nations, tax and social insurance liabilities are largely payable by the employee 
but withheld by the employer and paid directly to the tax authorities along with whatever 
employer contributions are obligatory in the specific country. By paying a low official 
declared salary and an additional undeclared envelope wage to employees, employers can 
significantly reduce their total salary costs by evading some of the social insurance and 
tax component of the wage bill, thus violating fundamental work payment principles.  
Superficially, some might believe that most employees would be willing co-
conspirators and happy to engage in this illegitimate wage arrangement. After all, 
employees might well assume that their total salary will be higher under this arrangement 
than if the employer were to withhold the full tax and social insurance liabilities. 
Analysing whether employees receiving envelope wages were indeed happy with this 
arrangement, however, the finding is that just 39 per cent were content to be paid a 
portion of their salary as an envelope wage, whilst 50 per cent would prefer full 
declaration and the remaining 11 per cent were either undecided or refused to answer. 
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Breaking this down, least happy were those receiving part of their regular wage as an 
envelope wage (21 per cent were content with this arrangement, 75 per cent would prefer 
full declaration and 4 per cent were undecided or refused to answer) whilst most content 
were those receiving envelope wages for overtime or extra work (55 per cent were happy 
and just 28 per cent would prefer full declaration).  
 
Impacts of envelope wages 
In part, this lack of contentment might be because employers do not pass onto employees 
the savings made from evading their full social insurance and tax liabilities (Round et al., 
2008; Williams, 2007; Williams and Round, 2007). This, however, was not examined in 
this survey and will need to be studied in future surveys. The lack of contentment, 
nevertheless, is also doubtless because recipients of envelope wages are significantly 
disadvantaged both in the wider society and the labour market. Not only does this 
practice reduce their mortgage and credit entitlements since their official wage is lower 
than their actual wage, but it also decreases the level of pension and social insurance they 
receive in welfare systems where these are tied to one’s previous official wage. Envelope 
wages, moreover, and unlike official wages, are often withheld by employers and there is 
no legal recourse for employees if this happens (Round et al, 2008; Sedlenieks, 2003; 
Williams, 2007; Williams and Round, 2007; Woolfson, 2007). Indeed, employers perhaps 
often use this wage practice as a ‘soft’ lever to target employees. By withdrawing 
envelope wages from those formal employees whom the employer no longer wishes to 
employ, these workers tend to voluntarily leave their formal employment and thus the 
issue of redundancy pay is avoided (Hazans, 2005; Round et al, 2008).  
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In consequence, envelope wages appear to largely benefit employers, rather than 
employees, and this wage practice from the above expressions of their contentment also 
seems to be generally imposed on, rather than chosen by, employees. Indeed, this is the 
finding of the previous qualitative accounts which show that envelope wages are often 
imposed by employers, often at the stage of offering the job, and unless candidates accept 
this wage arrangement, they are not offered the job and/or do not continue to be 
employed (Round et al, 2008; Sedlenieks, 2003; Williams, 2007).  
It is not solely employees receiving envelope wages, however, who suffer from 
this illegitimate arrangement. It also has negative impacts on legitimate businesses since 
envelope wages result in unfair competition. For governments and the wider society, 
meanwhile, such a practice decreases job quality and hinders the achievement of wider 
societal goals such as fuller-employment and social inclusion, not least by depriving the 
state of the tax revenue needed for financing social protection (European Commission, 
2007).  
 
Potential policy responses 
For all these reasons, the policy option of adopting a laissez-faire approach towards 
envelope wages is thus rejected. Sometimes, that is, it is assumed that if governments try 
to eradicate the practice of paying envelope wages, where at least the employees are 
officially registered and a portion of their earnings declared, employers might turn to 
wholly undeclared work. For this reason, a laissez-faire approach is advocated. Here, 
however, and due to the negative impacts of envelope wages highlighted above, this ‘do 
nothing’ approach is rejected. How, therefore, might this practice be tackled?  
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 In the broader tax non-compliance literature, two broad policy approaches are 
often highlighted, which could be also used to combat envelope wages (Commonwealth 
of Tax Administrators, 2006; Williams, 2008). These are on the one hand, a negative 
reinforcement or ‘sticks’ approach where employers paying envelope wages are detected 
and punished and on the other hand, a positive reinforcement or rewards approach that 
incentivises employers to shift their wage practices into the legitimate realm. 
The first option, therefore, is to detect and punish non-compliance by improving 
the rates of detection of such work and/or the level of punishments for those caught 
(Hasseldine and Li, 1999; Richardson and Sawyer, 2001). Whether this will be effective, 
however, is open to debate. Although some studies find that improving detection reduces 
tax non-compliance (Slemerod et al., 2001), others find that non-compliance grows 
(Bergman and Nevarez, 2006). Similarly, although some argue that increasing penalties 
reduces tax non-compliance (De Juan et al., 1994), others identify that increasing 
penalties leads to an expansion of non-compliance (Murphy, 2005). Indeed, some even 
conclude that ‘it is not sensible to penalize illicit work with intensified controls and 
higher fines’ (Schneider and Enste, 2002: 192). This is because increasing penalties and 
detection to force employers and employees to comply can alienate them, reducing 
voluntary compliance and amplifying (rather than decreasing) off-the-books practices by 
reducing their belief in the fairness of the system (Murphy, 2005). 
Another policy option, in consequence, is to facilitate compliance rather than 
detect and punish non-compliance (European Commission, 2007; Renooy et al, 2004; 
Small Business Council, 2004; Williams, 2006). This encouraging of ‘good’ behaviour 
(i.e., compliance) rather than taking it as given is grounded in a belief that punishing 
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people for doing something wrong (i.e., negative reinforcement) is relatively ineffective 
compared with positive reinforcement of good behaviour at eliciting behaviour change. 
At least three different type of measure can be employed in this approach. 
Firstly, there are preventative measures to stop employers paying envelope wages 
in the first place. These might include: simplifying regulatory compliance such as the 
procedures to both register and pay declared employees; shifting from direct to indirect 
taxation systems, and/or raising the level of the minimum wage in order to reduce the 
proportion of the total wage packet paid off-the-books (European Commission, 2007). In 
Baltic countries, that is, minimum wage levels have been set cautiously at around a third 
of the average monthly gross wage, namely 33 per cent in Estonia, 34 per cent in Latvia, 
38 per cent in Lithuania (Eurostat, 2007). The rationale of the Baltic governments was 
that this would prevent jobs shifting from the declared to the wholly undeclared 
economy. However, a low minimum wage might stop jobs shifting into the wholly 
undeclared sphere, but employers have greater scope for paying a larger portion of 
employees’ earnings as an envelope wage. Raising the minimum wage closer to the 
average wage level reduces the portion that can be paid as an envelope wage. If the 
minimum wage is set too high, nevertheless, employers might decide to employ workers 
wholly off-the-books. This policy measure of increasing the minimum wage level 
therefore needs to be carefully piloted and evaluated, especially with regard to estimating 
the tipping point at which employers shift from the declared to the wholly undeclared 
realm. Even if this proves effective and transferable, however, it will need to be 
recognised that this only reduces the share of salary paid as an envelope wage. It does not 
eradicate the problem. 
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Secondly, and to help those already paying envelope wages to legitimise their 
wage practices, curative measures can be adopted such as offering amnesties to 
employers seeking to move away from envelope wages and to fully declare employee 
salaries. Another option might be to shift from the use of direct to indirect taxes to tackle 
envelope wages, in order to reduce employer contributions and therefore the need for 
employers to seek savings in this manner, which is a proposal currently advocated by the 
European Commission (European Commission, 2007). Again, pilot studies are required 
to evaluate the impacts of such measures. 
Third and finally, commitment rather than compliance measures can be pursued, 
using indirect rather than direct controls, on a societal-wide level. This involves tackling 
envelope wages indirectly by combating the lack of tax morality (Alm and Torgler, 2006; 
Richardson, 2006; Torgler, 2003), and involves tax education and awareness raising 
about the benefits of declared work, peer-to-peer surveillance, and the pursuit at a 
governmental level of perceived tax fairness, procedural justice and redistributive justice. 
Fairness here refers to the extent to which individuals believe that they are paying their 
fair share compared with others (Wenzel, 2004), redistributive justice to whether citizens 
receive the goods and services they believe that they deserve given the taxes that they pay 
(Richardson and Sawyer, 2001) and procedural justice to the degree to which people 
believe that the tax authority has treated then in a respectful, impartial and responsible 
manner (Braithwaite and Reinhart, 2000; Murphy, 2005). Evidence from the UK reveals 
that campaigns advertising the benefits of declared work display a return-to-cost ratio of 
19:1 in terms of revenue returns for tax authorities (i.e., £19 return for every £1 spent) 
compared with a return-to-cost ration of just 5:1 for punitive measures such as increasing 
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penalties (National Audit Office, 2008). Indirect control methods, therefore, are 
potentially an effective tool for tackling envelope wages in Baltic nations.  
In sum, various tools exist for tackling envelope wages ranging from punitive 
through preventative and curative to commitment policy measures. These contrasting 
measures, of course, are not mutually exclusive. A government for example, might 
increase the minimum wage and at the same time offer amnesties to those employers 
putting their affairs in order by bringing under-declared wage practices into the declared 
realm and then, for those who fail to comply, implement tougher sanctions for those 
subsequently caught whilst at the same time introducing education campaigns to elicit 
greater commitment amongst employers and employees to tax morality.   
 
Conclusions 
 
Until now, beyond small scale qualitative accounts, few attempts have been made to 
evaluate the commonality and nature of envelope wage practices in the former Soviet 
Baltic republics that are now members of the EU, namely Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Poland. This paper has sought to fill that gap. Reporting a 2007 survey, some 1 in 8 
formal employees were paid an additional undeclared (envelope) wage during the 12 
months prior to the survey, and this amounted on average to 45 per cent of their gross 
wage. This practice, moreover, occurs across all sectors, occupations, firm sizes, 
countries and socio-economic groups throughout these Baltic states, even if it is relatively 
more common in some rather than others. Envelope wages, that is, are significantly more 
prevalent in smaller businesses and amongst employers in the construction sector, hotels, 
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restaurants and cafes and the retail sector, whilst those receiving envelope wages are 
significantly more likely to be men, younger age groups, manual workers, those on low 
incomes and working full-time who constitute the majority receiving envelope wages.  
These findings, nevertheless, come with a health warning. Given the sensitive and 
illegal nature of the issue under investigation, the experimental pilot nature of the survey 
and the low number of respondents receiving envelope wages in Baltic nations (namely 
158 employees), the above findings need to be treated with caution and perhaps viewed 
them as lower-bound estimates of the prevalence of envelope wages. Even as lower-
bound estimates, nevertheless, these findings have important implications.  
In terms of theorising formal and informal employment, this survey displays the 
need to move beyond the formal/informal jobs divide which depicts jobs as either formal 
or informal, but never simultaneously both, and to bring this hybrid employment 
arrangement more centre-stage in contemporary analyses of labour markets both in these 
former Soviet Baltic states and beyond. Indeed, further qualitative studies beyond Latvia 
and Lithuania in other Baltic states are perhaps now required in order to comprehend its 
impacts on employees, legitimate businesses, governments and the wider society. In 
terms of the implications for policy, meanwhile, this paper reveals the need for a more in-
depth discussion and evaluation of how this waged practice might be tackled. Until now, 
this has been seldom addressed, despite its prominence. Hopefully, therefore, this paper 
will encourage further interrogation of this so far largely neglected employment 
arrangement and how it might be tackled both in these former Soviet Baltic states and 
beyond. If it does so, then it will have achieved its objectives.  
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Table 1 % of employees paid envelope wages in the past 12 months in the former 
Soviet Baltic states, by country 
Country No. of  
waged 
employees 
surveyed 
% all 
employees 
receiving 
envelope 
wages 
 
% of 
gross 
income 
not 
declared 
by 
employer 
Envelope wages paid for: 
Regular 
work 
Overtime
/extra 
work 
Both 
regular 
& 
overtime 
work 
Refus
al + 
don’t 
know 
EU27 11,885 5 41 29 27 36 8 
Latvia 511 17*** 46*** 47*** 18 34 1 
Lithuania 446 11 48 44 10 46 0 
Poland 337 11 53 35 15 50 0 
Estonia 457 8 31 37 20 32 11 
All 4 Baltic 1,751 12 45 42 16 39 3 
Statistical significance: * = 0.05 (5% probability), **=0.01 (1%) and ***= 0.001 (0.1%) 
Source: Eurobarometer survey No.284, 2007 
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Table 2 Distribution of envelope wages in former Soviet Baltic states: by firm size 
and sector 
 % of 
employees 
receiving 
envelope 
wages 
% of gross 
wage received 
as an envelope 
wage 
% of all 
those 
receiving 
envelope 
wages 
% of 
surveyed 
employees 
All 4 countries 12 45 100 100 
No. of employees in business:     
  1-20 19*** 49*** 65 33 
  21-50 13 35 16 13 
  51-100 8 32 10 12 
  101-500 5 48 7 16 
  501+ 2 30 2 26 
Sector:     
  Construction  20*** 49*** 30 15 
  Industry  9 50 14 26 
  Household services 5 18 4 18 
  Transport 8 25 8 7 
  Personal services 13 32 18 15 
  Retail  16 56 19 13 
  Repair services 9 18 1 2 
  Hotel, Restaurants, cafes 16 10 5 3 
  Agriculture 8 15 1 1 
Statistical significance: * = 0.05 (5% probability), **=0.01 (1%) and ***= 0.001 (0.1%) 
Source: Eurobarometer survey no. 284, 2007 
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Table 3 Distribution of envelope wages in the former Soviet Baltic states: by 
population group 
 % 
receiving 
envelope 
wages 
% of 
gross 
wage not 
declared  
Share of all 
employees 
receiving 
envelope 
wages (%) 
% of 
surveyed 
employees 
All 12 45 100 100 
Gender:     
  Men 17*** 44*** 70 54 
  Women 8 47 30 46 
Age:     
  15-24 19*** 38*** 25 10 
  25-39 11 44 52 36 
  40-54 4 48 22 43 
  55+ 1 22 1 11 
Education (end of):     
  15 10*** 63*** 9 12 
  16 – 19 15 38 71 52 
  20+ 6 36 20 36 
Occupation:     
  Managers 5*** 56*** 10 31 
  Other white collar 7 46 14 21 
  Manual 16 44 76 48 
Gross formal job income/ month (€)     
  <500 19*** 46*** 66 20 
  500-1000 8 45 14 17 
  1001-2000 3 52 12 23 
  2001-3000 1 50 6 21 
  3001+ 1 52 2 18 
Hours/week in formal employment     
  <10 14*** 25*** 5 3 
  10-20 3 40 2 7 
  21-30 4 34 6 7 
  31-40 3 35 42 56 
  41+ 16 48 45 27 
Statistical significance: * = 0.05 (5% probability), **=0.01 (1%) and ***= 0.001 (0.1%) 
Source: Eurobarometer survey no. 284, 2007 
 
